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ABSTRACT 
The supplier and buyers, with different objectives and self-interest, are separate economic entities acting independently 
and opportunistically to maximize their individual profits. In this paper, a GBA model in the B2B market is studied, 
where one supplier faces 2 different retailers, who cooperate in the order decision making. Firstly, the optimal ordering 
decision of the retailers was analyzed. Then, from the perspective of the supplier, the optimal pricing strategy of the 
supplier is also studied. Finally, it is concluded that the group buying online auction is a useful and efficient pricing 
mechanism in the B2B e-market, under which, all members of the supply chain will improve their payoffs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The supplier and buyers, with different objectives and 
self-interest, are separate economic entities acting 
independently and opportunistically to maximize 
(minimize) their individual profits (costs). An effective 
supply chain network requires a cooperative relationship 
between the vendor and the buyer. Based on mutual trust, 
the cooperation includes the sharing of information, 
resources and profit. One of the most common strategies 
is to setup a pricing policy acceptable to both the vendor 
and the buyer. (Yang, 2004). 
 
The price discount policy is a subject of significant 
interest. Starting from Crowther (1964), Monahan (1984) 
was one of the early authors who analyzed a 
vendor-oriented optimal quantity discount policy that 
maximized the vendor’s gain; it is done at no additional 
cost to the buyer. Lee and Rosenblatt (1985) generalized 
Monahan’s model and developed an algorithm to solve 
the vendor’s ordering and discount-pricing policy. 
Buscher and Lindner (2004) further extend Lee and 
Rosenblatt’s model.  
 
However, their objective function is restricted to 
maximizing the supplier's profits only. Zahir and Sarker 
(1991) consider a price-dependent demand function for 
multiple regional wholesalers who are served by a single 
manufacturer. Meantime, in recent years, some studies 
have paid the attention on the perishable product with the 
policy of price discount. Wee (1999) introduces a 
deterministic inventory model with quantity discount, 
pricing and partial backordering when the product in 
stock deteriorates with time. Papachristos and Skouri 
(2003) generalize the work of Wee and consider a model 
where the demand rate is a convex decreasing function of 
the selling price and the backlogging rate is a 
time-dependent function, which ensures that the rate of 
backlogged demand increases as the waiting time to the 
following replenishment point decreases.  
 
In our paper, we also analyze the two-echelon supply 
chain consisting of one vendor and multiple different 
buyers, in which, the products is perishable. The main 
difference between our work and theirs is that a 
particular pricing mechanism, the Group buying online 
auction, is employed in our study. 
 
Group-buying auction is also a kind of quantity discount 
form. However, the GBA, unlike the traditional discount, 
does not lead to price discrimination among different 
buyers and every buyer will be charged the same price. 
Each buyer in the GBA will only buy a piece of product 
which means the price declines monotonically in total 
purchase quantities of all buyers, and not just an 
individual buyer’s purchase quantities. These are much 
different from the traditional quantity discount policy. 
 
Moreover, the group-buying auction (GBA), a 
homogeneous multi-unit auction, has many users on sites 
such as LetsBuyIt.com and Yabuy.com. Different from 
traditional auctions, where bidders compete against one 
another to be the “winner” with the highest price, the 
GBA enables bidders to aggregate to offer a lower price 
at which they all “win” (Horn et al. 2000). When using 
the GBA as the pricing mechanism, it is helpful to refer 
to traditional auction models. By considering the seller’s 
expected revenue, Vickrey (1961) proves the well-known 
Revenue Equivalent Principle and Myerson (1979) 
proves the Revelation Principle. The details about 
traditional auction studies can be found in Klemperer’s 
(1999) survey. However, the traditional auction theory 
does not consider inventory because it is not an 
important issue for those products. Internet expands 
online auction markets, where almost all products can be 
auctioned. Hence, our study tries to bridge the inventory 
management and auction process. 
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Although the GBA is widely used in the E-market, it 
lacks a theoretical framework and the study on the GBA 
is rare. Chen et al. (2002) build a dynamic game model 
for the GBA, based on which they study the bidders’ 
optimal strategy. They prove that the mechanism is 
incentive compatible for bidders under the IPV 
(independent private values) assumption. Kauffman and 
Wang (2002a) conduct an experimental study of the 
GBA. They analyze the changes in the number of bids 
for Mobshop-listed products over various periods. Based 
on the empirical study of twelve GBA websites, 
Kauffman and Wang (2002b) point out that because the 
GBA is still a new concept, the websites must educate 
consumers to achieve a critical mass. Anand and Aron 
(2003) devise an analytical model to study the GBA. 
They compare the posted pricing mechanism with the 
GBA in different scenarios, e.g., demand uncertainty and 
scale economies of production. On the other hand, the 
inventory literature has paid little notice to the marketing 
trends (Arcelus et al., 2003). Chen et al. (2004b) consider 
a GBA model for a monopolistic manufacturer selling 
novel products in the uncertain market and link this new 
pricing mechanism to the newsboy model. 
 
They, however, all do not study the GBA mechanism in 
the B2B market, which is a more prosper and profitable 
segment. Kauffman and Wang (2002b) suggest that the 
GBA websites oriented toward the B2B market should be 
better positioned for future growth. In the business 
practice, Mobshop changed its strategic direction from 
the B2C to the B2B market (Clark 2001) which is more 
profitable. According to Anand and Aron (2003), in the 
B2B market, the GBA has been employed to sell diverse 
goods and services, such as, furniture, commercial print, 
computer hardware, software, telecommunications & 
connectivity, electricity and gas, computer equipment, 
office supplies and vehicles, vegetables and company 
travel. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first 
in academia to study the GBA in the B2B e-market. Our 
effort is to regard the GBA as a useful and resultful 
coordination strategy in a two echelon supply chain in 
order to make a more effective and efficient decision in 
the B2B e-Market environment. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 
2, we build the model with one supplier and 2 retailers. 
Section 3 deduces the optimal order strategy for the 
retailers. In Section 4, we study the supplier’s optimal 
discount strategy. In section 5, we summarize the paper 
and describe the future research directions. 
 
2. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
 
Suppose two retailers, which will cooperate during the 
ordering decision process, order products from the same 
supplier and each retailer faces independent markets. 
First, the supplier will set the price curve (p1, p2, l), 
where p1>p2. Then the retailers will bid their order 
quantity. If the sum of the order quantity is equal to or 
greater than l, then all the retailers pay unit price p2 to get 
their order. Otherwise, the unit price is p1. Suppose 
retailer i faces the ith markets with unit sale price Si, and 
the demand is a random variable with PDF Fi（.）. At the 
end of the auction, the unsold products are perished with 
salvage 0. All information is common knowledge and the 
retailers make their decision simultaneously. i.e., they 
face a statistic game. 
 
3. THE ORDER STRATEGY FOR THE 
RETAILERS 
 
When no quantity discount is offered, the supplier’s unit 
selling price is p. Then each retailer faces the situation as 
the newsboy model and the payoff for retailer i is 
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When the two retailers cooperate, their optimal strategy 
is to maximize the whole profit of both retailers, i.e., 
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This problem can be solved in two steps: 
[Step I]  
Solve two nonlinear programming problems 
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Programming II 
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[Step II]  
Comparing the value of the objective function (1) and (2), 
the larger one is the optimal solution.  
 
Using this method and based on the following theorems, 
we can get the retailers’ optimal order strategy. 
 
Theorem 1 If lnn ≥+ *2*1 , the optimal order quantity for 
retailer 1 is ;*1
*
1 nN = and that for retailer 2 is *2*2 nN = . 
Proof: Because 
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since lnn ≥+ *2*1 , hence 
))))(1(
)()(()(
)()()(
))()(
)()()(
1
*
2
*
1
2
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
12
*
22
0
221
*
11
0
11
2
*
2
*
12
*
22
0
221
*
11
0
11
*
2
*
2
*
1
*
1
*
2
*
2
*
1
*
1
plnnH
plnnHnnxdFnS
xxdFSxdFnSxxdFS
pnnxdFnS
xxdFSxdFnSxxdFS
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
−+−+
−++−∫+
∫+∫+∫=
+−∫+
∫+∫+∫
∞+
∞+
∞+
+∞
 
Therefore, it can be deduced that ),( *2
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Q.E.D 
 
Lemma 1 The equation group 
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has one and only one solution (z1, z2). 
Proof: The existence of the solution is clear. Now, we 
will prove the uniqueness of the solution. Suppose there 
are two pairs of solutions (z1, z2), (z1’,z2’ ). 
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Theorem 2 If lnn <+ *2*1 and 21 ππ > , the optimal order 
quantity for tow retailers is 2
*
21
*
1 ; zNzN ==  
respectively. Otherwise, the optimal solution is 
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Proof: If lnn <+ *2*1 .Using K-T condition, the optimal 
solution for Programming I is (z1, z2) and the objective 
value is 1π . The optimal solution for Programming II is 
)),( *2
*
1 nn and the objective value is 2π . Therefore, we can 
deduce the result directly. 
Q.E.D 
Based on the above theorems, the optimal order quantity 
for retailer i, *iN , can be calculated with the following 
algorithm. 
[Step I]  
Comparing *2
*
1 nn + with l, if lnn ≥+ *2*1 , the optimal 
retailer 1 is ;*1
*
1 nN = and that for retailer 2 is *2*2 nN = . 
Otherwise, we will begin the step II. 
[Step II.]  
Comparing 1π with 2π , If lnn <+ *2*1 and 21 ππ > , the 
optimal solution is 2
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21
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1 ; zNzN == . Otherwise, the 
optimal solution is *2
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4. THE SUPPLIER’S OPTIMAL DISCOUNT 
STRATEGY 
 
We use a Stackelberg game framework to study the 
supplier’s strategy. When no quantity discount is offered, 
the supplier’s unit selling price is p. Then the supplier’s 
profit is ))(( *2
*
1 nncp +− .When using GBA, with price 
curve Q, suppose the retailer i’s optimal order quantity 
according the former section is Ni(Q), the payoff of the 
supplier is 
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The supplier will determine the discount price p2 and 
discount quantity threshold l. 
 
Assumption 1 Suppose if order N1 and N2 will bring the 
retailer the same expected profit and N1<N2, the retailer 
will choose N2 because more order quantity implies a 
higher consumer satisfaction.  
 
The supplier will determine the discount price p2 and 
discount quantity threshold l. 
Let we define 
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Lemma 2 For any given p2, optimal l*(p2) ≥  l(p2) 
Proof: If l < l(p2)  
Case 1: if l *2
*
1 nn +≤ , the sold quantity is *2*1 nn +  and 
the price is p2. The supplier’s profit is 
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the supplier’s profit is ))(()( 22
*
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Hence set l < l(p2) is not optimal for the supplier. 
Q.E.D 
If l > l(p2) , the retailer i’s order quantity is *in and the 
supplier’s profit is ))(( *2
*
11 nncp +− . When l = l(p2), the 
supplier’s profit is )()()( 222 plcplcp −=− .Let 
)()(maxarg 22
*
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−= .Then, the supplier’s optimal 
profit is )()( *2
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Theorem 3 If l = l(p2) and *2
*
1
*
2
*
2 ))()( nnplcp +>− , the 
optimal price curve is (p, p2*;l); else, trading price will 
keep p1, i.e. the supplier should not use GBA, i.e., do not 
offer any discount.  
 
Employing the GBA, all the supplier and retailers will 
get more profit, i.e., it is a Pareto improvement. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
In this paper, we employ the group-buying auction as a 
special pricing mechanism and study the supplier and 
retailers’ discount strategy and order strategy in the B2B 
e-Market. After building up the model framework, we 
optimize the retailers’ payoff and deduce the optimal 
order strategy. Then, from the perspective of the supplier, 
the optimal discount strategy is also studied. We 
conclude that with the GBA, all members of a supply 
chain will improve their profits.  
 
In our model we assume that the retailers are cooperative 
with each other during the ordering decision. However, if 
they make the decision completely independently, it is 
another story. Hence, it is interesting and meaningful to 
study such a case. 
 
Another important area for the future research is to 
extend the number of the retailers from 2 to k. It is more 
practical and helpful for the decision making of the 
supplier. 
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